This paper uses a new data source-containing monthly information about wages and salaries of all taxpayers in Denmark-to detect the use of year-end tax-avoidance strategies among top managers.
inquiries than usual concerning year-end tax planning. 1 The tax reform was expected to generate intertemporal income shifting effects of macroeconomic importance. The Congressional Budget Office (2013) projects 2013 tax revenue decreases because of shifting of income from calendar year 2013 into late 2012 in anticipation of the higher 2013 tax rate.
From an economic efficiency point of view, it is crucial to know whether behavioral responses to tax reforms are permanent or temporary (Slemrod 1995) , but with annual tax and income data it is difficult to empirically identify the temporary component due to intertemporal income shifting. 2 Kreiner, Leth-Petersen, and Skov (2013) exploit the monthly frequency of the new Danish data source, combined with reform variation in tax rates, to identify intertemporal income shifting behavior for the entire Danish population and to decompose the elasticity of taxable income into temporary and permanent components.
In this paper, we focus exclusively on year-end tax planning of top managers, and ask whether tax-avoidance strategies take place primarily by changing the timing in the payment of bonuses or by deferring/accelerating payments of regular wages and salaries.
I. Data
Our empirical analysis is based on monthly payroll records for all top managers working in 1 Rampell, Catherine. 2012. "With Higher Taxes Looming, Bonuses May Come Early." The New York Times, November 29.
2 Goolsbee (2000) uses annual data for corporate executives and finds large, significant effects from the Clinton tax increase of 1993 on the exercising of stock options but does not detect any strong timing-effects in payments of salary and bonuses. Findings in Sammartino and Weiner (1997) suggest that the 1993 reform did generate shifting in wage income. the private sector in Denmark. Since January 2008 firms in Denmark have been required by law to report wages and salaries of all employees to the tax agency (SKAT) at a monthly frequency. All the records are contained in an administrative register (the eIncome register) that also contains the Central Person Registry number of each individual, allowing us to link the monthly payroll information to other administrative registers at Statistics Denmark.
Top managers are identified according to the International Labor Organization's (ILO) International Standard Occupational Classification (ISCO). We include all corporate and general managers defined as employees belonging to major group 1 in the ISCO-88 classification.
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There are about 2.5 million wage earners in Denmark. The dataset analyzed here covers all of the 23,892 persons who are recorded as top managers and contains 37 monthly observations for the period 2008:1 to 2011:1. In 2008 the average monthly income for this group was 72,000 Danish crowns (DKK), corresponding to the 97.9 percentile in the overall distribution of wage incomes. 4 In one analysis, we focus on the subsample of chief executives and directors (category 121 in the ISCO-88 classification). This group consists of 4,861 persons with an average monthly income of 106,000 DKK in 2008, corresponding to the 99.4 percentile in the overall wage distribution.
II. Institutional Background
We quantify the extent of year-end tax planning of wage income using a tax reform decided in the Danish parliament at the end of May 2009, and taking effect from January 1, 2010. The reform reduced the highest marginal tax rate, which applies to wage income of top managers, from 63 percent to 56 percent, equivalent to a reduction in the after-tax rate close to 20 percent. This gave top managers a non-negligible economic incentive to postpone bonus payments or regular salary payments from 2009 to 2010, and half a year to plan such action. Kreiner, Leth-Petersen, and Skov (2013) show that tax planning in connection with the 2010 tax reform is carried out mainly by shifting income around the New Year where a tax reform is implemented, and we shall therefore focus on the income variation taking place in December and January.
It is impossible to carry out year-end tax planning single-handedly because the firms are reporting the wage income to the tax agency. However, top managers with inside-firm control probably have better opportunities to obtain firm collaboration than other employees. Moreover, it was possible to move wage payments earned in the second half of 2009 to 2010 without coming into conflict with the Danish law.
According to the tax rules, companies have to withhold and remit taxes on labor income at the time income is paid out to the employees, and taxes have to be remitted at least half a year after the income is earned.
Although it is not illegal to save money on taxes by changing the timing of the payout of wage income, this behavior is of course not an intended effect of the tax reform and the tax rules in general, and it is therefore a classic example of tax avoidance (rather than tax evasion).
III. Identification of Year-End Tax Planning
We consider two types of year-end tax planning of wage income: retiming of bonus payments and shifting of regular wage income from 2009 to 2010. 5 In both cases the taxpayer will have a lower observed wage income in December 2009 and a higher observed wage income in January 2010 compared to the counterfactual situation without a tax reform. We approximate the counterfactual income level using the observed income in the year before the reform was announced. Thus, year-end tax avoidance is identified by observing an unusually low wage level in December 2009 compared to December 2008 and an unusually high wage level in January 2010 compared to January 2008 for the same individual. Accordingly, we construct a shifting indicator dummy variable that takes the value 1 in any given month if income in that month is at least 50 percent above the 2008 level and income in the preceding month is at least 50 percent below its 2008 level. The 50 percent cutoff criterion defining shifting behavior is somewhat arbitrarily chosen, but the result turns out to be reasonably stable with respect to the choice of cutoff level. If we consider criteria with alternative cutoff levels of 6 To be precise, the dummy variable is equal to 1 in year y, month m if the income difference between (y, m) and the definition of the shifting indicator accounts for seasonal variation in wage income, i.e., it is not equal to 1 in January 2010 for a person who always has low income in December and high income in January. 25 percent and 75 percent then the conclusion is that 5-7 percent of top managers engage in year-end shifting activity.
If we narrow down the sample to the 4,861 chief executives and directors (category 121 in the ISCO-88 classification) and repeat the analysis using the 50 percent cutoff criterion then we find that the share of shifters is 10 percent, i.e., considerably higher than the 6 percent obtained for the full sample of top managers. 
V. Timing of Bonuses versus Timing of Wage Income
In this section, we analyze whether the detected income shifting primarily arises In panel B of Figure 2 , we do a similar analysis, but now decomposing the tax avoiders into two groups depending on whether or not they shift regular wage income. The black curve is the average monthly wage payment of those who defer regular wage payments, identified as individuals with a wage payment in December 2009 that is 50 percent below the average monthly 2008 level. According to this criterion, 1,245 top managers, corresponding to 75 percent of the year-end tax shifters, shift regular wage income. For these individuals, we see only a small spike in December 2008 and December 2010, indicating that only very few of these top managers normally receive a year-end bonus. This is consistent with the gray curve in panel B of Figure 2 showing the development of wages of the group not shifting regular wage payments. Clearly, top managers belonging to this residual group normally receive a bonus in December and have decided to shift the December 2009 bonus to January 2010.
Overall, the evidence in Figure 2 points toward the existence of two nearly distinct groups: those shifting bonuses (29 percent) and those shifting regular wage income (75 percent) with only little overlap between the two groups. Slemrod (1995) describes a hierarchy of responses to taxation with low expected responsiveness of labor supply/effort at the one end of the spectrum and high responsiveness in income timing decisions at the other end of the spectrum. Our result of substantial year-end tax planning is consistent with this view.
The discrete nature of bonus payments makes it easy to adjust the timing of these payments. It is likely more complicated to defer payment of regular wage income, for example because regular payouts are processed automatically by a computerized wage system. The hierarchy reasoning then implies that the timing of bonuses is more sensitive to a changing tax environment than the timing of regular wage income. Our results are consistent with this hypothesis. Out of all top managers, 1,698 receive a bonus payment at the end of 2008, according to the 50 percent cutoff criterion, and 28 percent of these individuals engage in year-end tax planning by postponing the bonus payment. For the 22,194 top managers not receiving a bonus, only 5 percent shift regular wage income. This indicates that bonus shifting is higher in the behavioral response hierarchy than shifting of regular wage income.
VI. Conclusion
We use Danish high-frequency payroll data to identify the extent of year-end tax avoidance of top managers. Using a tax reform that reduced the marginal tax rate for this group, we show that 5-7 percent of all top managers exploit year-end tax planning strategies in order to save taxes. Around 30 percent of the top managers engaging in this type of tax avoidance do so by retiming bonus payments while the rest shift regular wage income.
Among top managers receiving a December bonus, we find that more than 1 out of 4 retime the payment in order to reduce tax payments. In comparison, only 1 out of 20 of those not receiving a bonus engages in shifting of regular wage income. This is consistent with Slemrod's (1995) hierarchy of responses presuming that bonuses are shifted more easily than regular wage income.
These results for year-end tax planning of top managers complement the results in Kreiner, Leth-Petersen, and Skov (2013) showing among other things that income shifting takes place at all income levels, but is more common among taxpayers with high incomes.
